Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis by Schafer Mark Malici Akan Walker Stephen G

Author:Schafer, Mark,Malici, Akan,Walker, Stephen G.
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Social Sciences
Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
Published: 2010-12-07T16:00:00+00:00

Conclusion

My analysis leads me to the following conclusions. First, the belief systems of Kim Il Sung and Fidel Castro differed significantly from the average leader’s with Castro displaying more dramatic deviations in the form of significant differences for the key beliefs affecting general strategic orientation (I-1), image of others (P-2), and control over historical development (P-4). Second, while Fidel Castro shows some evidence of simple and diagnostic learning in the post-cold war period, I argue for a cautious interpretation because only a few of his beliefs changed significantly, and only one of the indices for key beliefs (P-4) shows significant learning. Kim Il Sung’s beliefs did not change signficantly, indicating that he did not engage in any learning. Third, the evidence from the MANOVA presented above also suggests that the end of the cold war had only a modest impact on the Cuban and North Korean leadership, independent of the specific regional circumstances, personalities or identities of Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung. Instead, when I control for the tumultuous events that have accompanied the end of the cold war, there are significant differences between Castro’s and Kim’s belief systems.

These results lead me back to a debate introduced at the beginning of this chapter, namely the debate between “structuralists” and “cognitivists.” And it is within the context of this debate that I want to set forth some more general conclusions. “When do governments change course, and why?” is a question that has received considerable attention in the international relations literature (Hermann 1990; Wendt 1992). Structural approaches focus on changes in the international environment and predict that they will impact the foreign policies of individual states. During the late 1980s and early 1990s the configuration of the international system, Cuba’s and North Korea’s position within it, and the dyadic relationships between the Soviet Union vis-à-vis Cuba and North Korea changed profoundly.

Despite forceful arguments made by structuralists (Waltz 1979; Wolfers 1962) that these “external shocks” (Hermann 1990) should lead to changes in the foreign policy behavior especially of small states, Cuba and North Korea continue on the status quo path with rather minor changes in their foreign policies. I contend, therefore, that changes in foreign policy will be missing in the absence of change at the individual level. In opposition to structural approaches, we conclude that governments and their respective leaders do not necessarily “respond in a rational manner to the reward and punishment contingencies of the international environment” (Tetlock 1991: 24). Instead, the mechanisms for continuity and change are located in the belief systems of leaders. I also agree with Wendt (1992) that a change in leadership may be more potent than an environmental change, as in the case of Mikhail Gorbachev’s accession to power in the USSR and his subsequent initiatives to end the cold war.

An alternative strategy for foreign policy change may be to alter the Cuban and North Korean leaderships’ perceived security context. Both consider the United States as a main threat to their respective regimes. By employing

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